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Abstract—This paper introduces a scalable and secure
contract-enforcement mechanism, called Cop, which can be
applied to a broad range of multi-agent systems including small
and large systems, time-critical systems, and systems-of-systems.
Cop enforces contracts (or protocols) via the existing Law-
Governed Interaction (LGI) mechanism, coupled with a new
protective layer that significantly enhances the dependability and
security of such enforcement.
Cop is arguably superior to the currently popular blockchain-
based smart-contract mechanisms, due to its scalability, inter-
operability, and the breadth of the spectrum of its domain of
applications.
Index Terms—distributed systems, enforcement of protocols,
LGI, smart-contracts, dependability, security
I. INTRODUCTION
There are many situations where a group of autonomous
actors—which may be software processes, physical devices,
and/or people operating via a platform like a smart-phone—
need to interact with each other over the Internet. The members
of such a group, who may not trust each other, may be required
to interact subject to a given protocol. Such a protocol may
represent a contract that binds these actors, or it may be
necessary for the actors to collaborate effectively on some
common goal, or to compete safely over the use of some
resources. We call a group of actors that comply with a given
protocol P, a P-community, or simply a community.
It is sometimes possible to establish a given protocol P over
a community by relying on voluntary compliance with it, by
all the members of this community. Voluntary compliance can
be effective when a community is homogeneous, or when it
is relatively small and its members trust each other, or when
its members are well managed. But otherwise, for voluntary
compliance with a given protocol P to be effective it needs to
satisfy the following two conditions, as argued in [6]: (a) it
must be the vested interest of every member of the community
to comply with P; and (b) a failure to comply with P, by
anybody, should not cause any serious harm to anybody else
in the given community. And if any one of these conditions is
not satisfied, then the given protocol may need to be enforced.
The enforcement of protocols is the subject of this paper. And
we call a mechanism used for enforcing protocols a protocol
enforcement mechanism or PEM.
We start in Section II by introducing the set of qualities of a
PEM that we consider essential. We continue in Section III by
reviewing two existing realizations of PEM: (a) the currently
popular blockchain-based smart-contract mechanism, and (b)
the older law-governed interaction (LGI) mechanism intro-
duced by the 1st author—evaluating them in terms of these
qualities. We find that each of these mechanisms fails to satisfy
some of these qualities.
We obtain a PEM that satisfies all these qualities, by
extending LGI into what we call Cop. Before introducing
Cop we outline, in Section IV, the LGI mechanism itself,
and describe its shortcoming—which we attempt to resolve.
The LGI-based Cop mechanism is introduced in Section V,
and discussed further in subsequent sections. We conclude in
Section VIII, and with an appendix in Section A.
a) A Terminological Comment: In the computer-science
literature the concept of protocol is sometimes referred to as
a contract, and sometimes as a law. All three terms are being
used here in the following way: We use the term “protocol” as
a general term, when not discussing any particular enforcement
mechanism; we use the term “contract” when discussing
blockchain-based smart-contracts; and we use the term “law”
when discussing LGI and Cop.
II. THE ESSENTIAL QUALITIES OF
PROTOCOL-ENFORCEMENT MECHANISMS
There is a wide range of types of applications that may
benefit from the enforcement of protocols. Such applications
differ along several dimensions. Some are small, others may
be very large. Some are simple enough to be handled as
a single community operating subject to a single protocol,
others consist of multiple communities, operating subject to
different protocols, which may need to inter-operate in various
ways. Some applications are lax about the speed of protocol
enforcement, others are time-critical. The actors involved in
such applications may include software processes, people, and
physical devices (i.e., devices that belong to IoT).
One would like to have a single protocol-enforcement mech-
anism (PEM) which is sufficiently broad-spectrum to support
a wide range of potential applications. We identify below four
qualities that a PEM should satisfy to be sufficiently broad-
spectrum.
1) Sufficiently short latency: By latency we mean, the time
it takes for a PEM to resolve a given transaction1. The
maximal latency that a given application may require
varies widely. It may, for example, be of the order
of a few minutes for many commercial and financial
systems. But it may be of the order of milliseconds or
less for the so-called time-critical applications—such as
a collection of interacting physical machines operating
in an industrial plant, or the components of an airborne
control system interacting with each other.
2) Scalability: By scalability we mean here that the latency
is virtually independent of the volume and frequency of
transactions in a given system. Scalability is a challenge
to large systems, such as enterprise systems, and to
infrastructures such as air-traffic control systems. It is
also a challenge to financial systems such as the one
described in [3], where ”a reasonable estimate of [its]
peak figure may be in the region of several thousand
transactions per second.”
3) Interoperability: By interoperability we mean: the ability
of communities that operate subject to different pro-
tocols to interact with each other. Of course, such an
ability needs to be subject to regulation. That is, there
needs to be a way to control which communities can
interact with each other, and how.
Interoperability is required, in many situations. In par-
ticular, when different small businesses, each operating
under its own protocol, need to interact with each other.
Moreover, complex systems, such as enterprise systems,
cannot be governed by a single protocol. Rather, differ-
ent communities of actors that belong to the same sys-
tem, but engaged in different types of activities, would
be required to operate subject to different protocols. And
such communities often need to interact with each other.
Therefore, a PEM needs to support multi-community
systems, where different communities, operating under
different protocols, need to be able to interact, subject
to some constraints. Moreover, as we have shown [9],
effective modularity of the set of protocols, that thus
govern a complex system, can be achieved by organizing
them into the so-called conformance hierarchies.
4) Dependability and Security: By this we mean the degree
to which a PEM can defend itself against failures and
programming errors (dependability) and against attacks
(security). Dependability and security are, of course,
critical for many applications.
It is worth pointing out that the satisfaction of any of these
qualities is not a zero/one predicate, so our objective is a
1We use the term “transaction” to mean any interactive operation by one
of the actors in a given community.
substantial satisfaction of these qualities.
III. ON THE STATE-OF-THE-ART OF PROTOCOL
ENFORCEMENT MECHANISMS
In the following two sub-sections we consider two existing
protocol-enforcement mechanisms mentioned in the introduc-
tion, evaluating them in terms of the qualities described above,
and finding both of them wanting.
A. The Blockchain-based Smart-Contract Mechanism
This type of mechanisms—which was inspired by a 1997
paper [12] by Nick Szabo—became very popular recently,
mostly for financial and commercial applications (see [11]).
The main characteristic of smart-contracts is that the enforce-
ment of contracts is carried out over a blockchain, which
provides this mechanism with a high level of security.
But smart-contracts do not satisfy well the other three
qualities listed above. First, the latency of a smart-contract
cannot be shorter than the time in takes to reach consensus—
a fundamental element of blockchains. And this latency is
quite substantial–it is currently of the order of a few minutes
under the various implementations of smart-contract, and it
probably cannot be made much shorter than a few seconds.
This means that smart-contracts cannot be used for many time-
critical applications.
Second, the smart-contract mechanism is not scalable, as
is frequently admitted by many researchers and developers of
such systems. And although many, like [13], are working on
reducing the level of unscalability, the lack of scalability is
inherent in the blockchain-based smart-contract mechanisms.
This is because, despite the distributed nature of the consensus,
regarding which block to admit to the various copies of the
blockchain, the enforcement itself is essentially centralized,
and linear, for the following reason: A new block cannot
be admitted to the blockchains, without sacrificing security,
before the previous block is resolved. Now suppose that it
takes T seconds to select a block (via a distributed consensus
mechanism), to be admitted into the distributed blockchain,
and to be resolved according to the contract at hand; and
suppose that the average number of transaction that can be
included in a block is B. Now, if more thanB new transactions
arrive, on average, to the blockchain in T seconds, then the
length of the queue of transactions waiting to be processed
will increase linearly in time. And the latency will increase,
proportionally with the length of the queue. So, such a
mechanism is inherently unscalable.
Third, blockchain-based smart-contracts cannot handle re-
ally complex systems, such as federated enterprises, supply
chain, and health-care systems. Such systems are composed
of many different communities operating under different in-
terdependent contracts which often need to inter-operate. But
despite some recent attempts to make blockchains interoperate,
such as by the Cosmos project, none of them provides a
practical and general solution to this problem. The Cosmos
project, in particular, features a hub blockchain involved in
all interoperations. And it seems to us that the use of such a
hub would decrease the scalability and the security of smart-
contracts.
B. The Law-Governed Interaction (LGI) Mechanism:
This mechanism, which is discussed in some detail in Sec-
tion IV, satisfies most of the qualities we required in Section II.
This includes very short latency, high level of scalability, and
a very general concept of controllable interoperability. But
although LGI is reasonably secure—arguably more secure than
the centralized access control mechanisms—LGI has a serious
security weakness described in Section IV-F, which this paper
aims to resolve. We sometime refer to this weakness of the
security of LGI as its Achilles heel.
IV. AN OUTLINE OF LGI, AND ITS Achilles Heel
This section is an outline of the LGI mechanism, which
should suffice for the understanding of the rest of this paper.
But for a deeper and more detailed description of LGI, we
propose two, somewhat dated, sources: (a) a Journal paper
[10]; and (b) the manual of LGI [8]. We confine ourselves
here to the treatment of a single community of actors that are
supposed to interact with each other subject to a common LGI-
law L—such a community is called an L-community, and we
occasionally refer to it as C.
The enforcement of an LGI-law is strictly decentralized, as
follows: Each member a of C interacts with other members
of C via a private surrogate (called a controller) that enforces
law L over the interactive activities of a. Such an enforcement
is done locally, with no knowledge of, or dependency on,
anything that happens simultaneously at the surrogates of other
members of C. (This locality is the consequence of the nature
of laws, as we shall see below). So, the enforcement of a law L
over the interactive activities of members of the L-community
is done in a decentralized manner, and thus in parallel, by the
various surrogates of the members of C. This enforcement is
very efficient, and inherently scalable.
The rest of this section is organized as follows: Section IV-A
describes the service that provides actors with the controllers
that can serve as their surrogates; Section IV-B describes how
a given actor can become a member of the L-community, for
a given law L; Section IV-C outlines the structure of LGI-
laws; Section IV-D introduces two simple examples of laws;
Section IV-E points out that LGI can handle far more complex
systems than is implied by the single community discussed so
far. Finally, Section IV-F discusses the security vulnerability
of LGI, which is what this paper is intended to relieve.
A. A Trustworthy Controller-Service (CoS)
LGI require the availability of a set of authentic generic
controllers that are trusted to operate as surrogates of arbitrary
actors, subject to any well formed LGI-law selected by them.
Such a generic controller is denoted by T , which suggests that
it needs to be trusted to enforce correctly any LGI-law loaded
into it. A controller operating under a given law L is called
an L-controller, and is denoted by TL.
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Fig. 1. A pair of interacting agents, operating under possible different laws
There are several ways for supplying such generic con-
trollers. One of this is to create a controller service (CoS)
that maintains set of authentic controllers, and leases them to
its customers, presumably for a fee. The CoS can use various
techniques for guarding against corruption of controllers. In
particular it can use the TPM (Trusted Platform Module) tech-
nology, or some more recent variant of it. This is particularly
easy to do because all generic controllers have identical codes,
which would have a single and stable hash.
To be trustworthy, a CoS must be managed by a highly
reputable organization, which can vouch for the authenticity
of its controllers. Moreover, the CoS should provide each of
its controllers with a digital certificate signed by the CoS
itself. This certificate is used by the controllers to authenticate
themselves as genuine LGI-controllers. The CoS is the trusted
computing base (TCB) of LGI.
B. The Concept of an L-Agent, and the Formation of an L-
Community
1) An L-agent and its formation: Any actor a can attempt
to operate under a given law L, thus joining the L-community.
It can do so by performing the following two steps: (i) acquir-
ing a generic controller T from the CoS; and (ii) adopting this
controller to be its surrogate, subject to law L.
If the adoption of a controller T subject to law L is
successful, then this controller would be denoted by TLa , which
means that T now operates as the surrogate of a, subject to
law L. Now, the pair 〈a, TLa 〉, is called an L-agent, which is
denoted by a. The mediator TLa is called the private controller
(or simply the controller) of agent a, and the actor a, whose
internal structure is irrelevant to this model, is said to animate
agent a.
But note that the attempt of a to form an L-agent may fail,
because law L may refuse to allow a to do so. For example,
law L may require a password, or a certificate, to be submitted
by a in its adoption command. This would prevent any actor
that cannot authenticate itself in the manner required by law
L from operating as a member of the L-community.
2) The Dual Mediation of Communication Under LGI:
One of the significant aspects of LGI is that it involves dual
mediation of every exchange of messages between LGI-agents:
one on the side of the sender of a message, and one on the
side of its receiver. Specifically, the passage of a message
from an actor Ax of an L-agent x to an actor Ay of an L
′-
agent y, must be mediated first by the controller TLx associated
with Ax, and then by the controller T
L
′
y , associated with Ay ,
as is illustrated in Figure 1. This is a direct consequence of
the locality of LGI-laws, which requires both the sender and
receiver to individually comply with the law under which each
of them operates.
The dual mediation under LGI has several important impli-
cations, not the least of which is that it facilitates interoperabil-
ity by providing flexible control over cross-interaction between
agents operating under different laws, as is further discussed
in Section IV-E. Moreover, as has been shown in [10], the dual
control turns out to be more efficient than centralized control,
in many circumstances. A simple illustration of the nature of
dual mediation, and some of its consequences, is provided by
the example laws on Section IV-D.
3) On the Formation of an L-Community: An L-
community is created simply by the creation of the first L-
agent by some actor a. No special initialization of an L-
community is required. And the membership of such a com-
munity evolves incrementally, by the creation or destruction
of L-agents. The structure and dynamic behavior of such a
community, which depends on the nature of its law, is explored
in [1].
C. The Concept of Law Under LGI
An LGI-law L is formulated in terms of three elements,
defined with respect to a given L-controller x. The following
is an incomplete description of these elements:
(1) A set E of regulated events (or, simply, events) that
may occur at x. E includes, among others: (a) the adoption
of this controller, under a given law L—which is the first event
that occurs at x. (b) The arrival of a message at x, and the
sending of a message by it. Note that a message may arrive at
x mostly from three sources: (i) from another controller; (ii)
from the actor that adopted x; and (iii) as a result from some
exception-condition, which is reported to x via a message.
And (3) an event called obligationDue that has to do with the
pro-active capability if LGI. This type of events discussed in
Section VII-B.
(2) The state Sx of controller x, which is distinct from the
internal state of the actors that uses x as its surrogate—of
which the law is oblivious. The state Sx is an unbounded (but
often small) set of terms, whose structure is left unspecified
here.
(3) A set O of operations that can be mandated by a law,
to be carried out by the controller x upon the occurrence of a
regulated events at it. The set O includes, among others: (a)
replacing the state Sx of x with another state (or, if you will,
changing the state Sx); and (b) sending some messages, to
anybody on the Internet. (Note that the sending of a message
by x, as mandated by the law, would constitute a new event
at x.)
Now, the role of a law is to decide what should be done
in response to the occurrence of any regulated event at a
controller operating under it. This decision, with respect to
controller x, is formally defined by the following mapping:
E × Sx → (O)
∗ × Sx (1)
Using a less formal notation: the law, when applies to a
given controller x, is a function
law : (e, s)→ (m,ns) (2)
that maps any a given pair (e, s), into a ruling (m,ns). Here
e is an event that occurred at controller x, and s is the state
of x at the time of occurrence of this event. And the ruling
that x is to carry out, consists of: (a) a (possibly empty) list
m of operations that x must execute (which are, most often,
messages to be sent); and (b) a new state ns that is to replace
the current state of x.
This definition makes it clear that the law is strictly local.
Indeed, the event that occurs at the controller and its state are
local. And the ruling is to be carried out locally. Of course,
if the ruling calls for some message to be sent to another
controller, then this message would eventually have a non-
local effect. But the decision to send such a message is local.
It should be pointing out that while Formula 1 is a definition
of the semantics of laws2, it does not specify a language
for writing them. In fact, the current implementation of LGI
supports several law-languages, one of which is JavaScript.
The choice of a law-language has no effect on the semantics
of LGI, as long as the chosen language is sufficiently powerful
to specify all possible mappings defined by Formula 1.
1) Additional Observations about LGI-Laws and their En-
forcement:
a) Non-Deterministic Laws: A law may be non-
deterministic in that its rulings may include random numbers.
Such laws are useful, in particular, for the protocols involving
randomness and tie-breaking. The implementation of non-
determinism under Cop is discussed in [5].
b) On the Interplay Between the Fixed Law and the
Changing State of a Controller x: On one hand, the ruling of
the law may depend on the current state of x, on the other hand
the evolution of the state is regulated by the law—although it
is driven by the various event that occur at x, most of them
coming from other controllers in a given community.
c) About the Enforcement of Laws: A controller x deals
with events occurring at it sequentially, and if several events
occur at x at the same time, they will be handles in an arbitrary
order. Also, the ruling of an event e is carried out atomically,
before handling any subsequent event.
D. Two Examples of Laws
We introduce here two very simple examples of LGI-laws,
called money transfer law (MT ) and monitoring law (MO).
The formar law is stated formally in one of the law-languages
currently supported by LGI, and the latter law is described
informally. We will return to these laws in Section IV-F, and
also in Section V.
A Money Transfer Law (MT ): This law provides an
initial budget of $1000 to every MT -agent (this is done
upon the adoption of a controller with law MT ). And then,
2Modulo the fact that the sets E of events and O of operations have not
been fully spelled out here.
this law enables every MT -agent to transfer to others any
amount of money smaller than or equal to its current budget. A
formal statement of this law—written in the the law-language
based on CoffeeScript (a semantically equivalent variant of
JavaScript)—is spelled out in Box 1. This law has three rules,
each of them contains comments (lines starting with #) that
explain its effect.
AMonitoring (MO) Law: The following informally stated
law, called MO, establishes a systematic monitoring scheme
for all communication within a given community.
1) When any new MO-agent is created—by an actor
adopting a controller after inserting law MO into
it—the controller of the newborn agent would send a
message to the designated monitor, essentially recording
its own birth.
2) Whenever an MO-message is sent, a copy of it, along
with the addresses of the sender and its target, is sent
to the monitor.
Law 1. Money Transfer Law
Name: MT
LawScript: CoffeeScript
# (R1) When the controller is adopted,
# initialize the agent’s budget to 1000.
UPON "adopted", ->
DO "set", key: "budget", value: 1000
return true
# (R2) An agent can send any positive amount of money
# to another agent provided that the amount
# is not greater than its budget,
# then the amount will be deducted from its budget.
UPON "sent", ->
if @message > 0 and @message <= CS("budget")
DO "set", key: "budget", value: CS("budget") - @message
DO "forward"
return true
# (R3) When an agent receives a positive amount of money,
# the amount will be deposited to its budget.
UPON "arrived", ->
if @message > 0
DO "set", key: "budget", value: CS("budget") + @message
DO "deliver"
return true
E. Beyond Singleton Communities
So far we have discussed the case of an singleton L-
community, whose members interact with each other subject
to a common law. But LGI is far more general than that,
in the following ways, in particular: First, LGI can handle
any number of communities, operating under different laws.
Second, LGI can enable members of different such commu-
nities, say C1 and C2—each operating under its own law—
to interact with each other in a regulated manner. This can
be done by having the laws of each of these community
specify the condition under which its members can interact
with each other. And third, LGI enables the organization of
a set of laws that collectively governs a single system, into a
coherent ensemble called a conformance hierarchy H . H is
a tree of laws rooted by a law called LR. And every law in
H , except of LR itself, conforms transitively to its superior
law. Moreover the conformance relation between laws in H is
inherent in the manner in which H is constructed, requiring no
extra validation. For a formal definition of such an hierarchy
of laws see [2], and for a recent application of it to complex
systems see [9].
F. The Security Vulnerability of LGI
Even if the CoS of LGI does its utmost to maintain and
protect authentic controllers there is, of course, no way to
ensure that controllers cannot be corrupted and would violate
the the law under which they are supposed to operate. Such
a corruption may be the result of an attack on a controller,
either by an insider of the CoS, or by an outsider who dis-
covered some vulnerability in the code of controllers. We are
concerned here mostly about the resulting Byzantine behavior
of controllers, and not about their fail-stop type of failure,
which can be handled effectively by LGI
The possible failure of individual controllers may be con-
sidered an acceptable risk in distributed computing, as it
poses a smaller risk than that of the corruption of a central
reference monitor commonly used in access control. Indeed,
the corruption of a central reference monitor can endanger an
entire system, while the corruption of a few controllers usually
have a more local effect.
Yet, in some cases a Byzantine failure of even a single
controller may cause a serious damage to the community at
large. A case in point is the money-transfer law presented in
Section IV-D. If a single controller has been corrupted, it may
be able to distribute a large amount of fake money among
other members of the MT -community, without raising any
suspicion, at least for a while. The Achilles heel of LGI is
that it provide no general means for even detecting corrupt
controllers.
Our approach for resolving this Achilles heel, thus pro-
tecting a system from the misbehaviors of its controllers, is
the following: We provide a general mechanism that detects
quickly and reliably any failed controller, right after it first
failed to satisfy the law under which it operates; and then to
recover from such a failure. This mechanism, called detection
& recovery (or D&R), is the subject of the rest of this paper.
But first, we should make the following observation: There
is, of course, a very general technique for handling Byzantine
failures, see [4] for example. In principle, this techniques can
be applied to every controllers of LGI. But this would be
prohibitively too inefficient and expensive for most potential
applications of LGI.
V. THE LGI-BASED COP MECHANISM
Cop carries out two complementary functions in enforcing
a given law L over an L-community C. One function is the
enforcement, per se, of law L over the interactive activities of
the members of C. The other function is the speedy detection
of any failure of an L-controller to enforce law L, followed
immediately by the recovery from this failure, which includes
the repair of the failed controller, and by the resumption of its
operation.
These dual functions are carried out by two disjoint pro-
cesses that operate in concert. One process is the enforcement
of law L over the L-community, which is done by means of
the LGI mechanism, outlined in Section IV3, which provides
LGI with an important proactive capability (cf. [5]). The
other process, which operates off-line of the enforcement
mechanism, is the detection of any misbehaving (or failed)
controllers, and the recovery from such failures. This is done
by a mechanism called D&R, for Detection and Recovery. The
D&R part of Cop is the main subject of the rest of this paper.
It should be noted that—for simplicity—most of our de-
scription of Cop involves the treatment of a single isolated
L-community, whose members interact only with each other
subject to law L. But as we shall see, Cop can handle
any number of such communities. Moreover, as explained in
Section VII-A, Cop is not limited to dealing with isolated
communities. Rather, like LGI itself, Cop can govern complex
systems constituted of many interacting communities, inter-
operating with each other subject to a conformance-hierarchy
of laws.
We conclude this section with a description of the main
components of Cop, and of the roles they play. The operations
of the D&R mechanism, is discussed in Section VI.
A. The Components of the Cop Mechanism
The Cop mechanism is composed of three types of compo-
nents that operate in concert.
1) The controller provider (CP), which is a variant of
the CoS of LGI. Besides the maintenance of generic
controllers, as does the CoS, the CP participates actively
in the operations of the D&R mechanism.
2) The ledger DL that maintains a record of the interactive
behavior of all L-controllers—i.e., the controllers that
serve the L-community.
3) The inspector IL, which performs the inspection of
the interactive behavior of all L-controllers in order to
detect any failure of any one of them, and to initiate the
recovery of such failures.
Note that while the Cop mechanism has just one CP, which can
handle any number of communities, each active L-community
is served by its own pair (DL, IL) of ledger and inspector,
respectively. Note also, that the various ledgers and inspectors
are to operate on different hosts, then the hosts used by CP.
These three types of components are described in details in
the following three subsections.
1) The Controller Provider (CP): The CP plays two kinds
of roles. First, like the controller-service (CoS) of LGI, CP
maintains generic controllers, and provides them to its clients.
In that, CP is a more reliable version of the CoS, as argued
below. Second, CP plays an important role in the operation
of the D&R mechanism. These two roles are discussed in the
following two paragraphs.
a) The Maintenance of Generic Controllers: The main
structural difference between the CP and the CoS, in this
respect, is that under the CP, controllers are encapsulated in
Linux containers [7], hosted by a group of servers we call
CPnodes, which are managed by the CP.
3There is just one difference between the LGI version used in Cop, and the
older LGI—it is the implementation of the concept of enforced obligation
The CP can maintain any number of CPnodes, and each
CPnode can host several hundreds of generic controllers,
depending on the applications using them. And the controllers
residing on any given CPnode may end up operating under
different laws, and thus serving different communities. All
the controllers resident in a given CPnode are managed by a
local manager running on this CPnode—some of the functions
of the local manager will be discussed in due course. The
CP as a whole is managed by a global manager running
on a distinguished CPnode of the CP. (And it would be
useful, and quite elegant although not entirely necessary, for
all these managers to interact with each other, subject to
suitable management-law under LGI—this is not done in
present prototype of Cop.)
The encapsulation of controllers in containers has several
advantages. In particular, this architecture enables the imposi-
tion of limits on the use of various resources—such as CPU,
memory and communication—by individual controllers. Such
limits can be imposed by the local manager of the CPnode and
dynamically adjusted by it. The ability to impose such limits
would make controllers more robust because it can help to
prevent an individual controller from hogging resources, thus
preventing others from operating effectively, or at all.
b) The Role that CP Plays in the Operations of the
D&R Mechanism: The CP carries out two functions that are
essential to the D&R mechanism, as follows:
(b.1) Supplying the ledger DL with the information it
needs: As we shall see later, the detection of the failure of
controllers by D&R requires that all the events that occur
at every L-controller, and all the operations carried out by
it, be logged correctly on the ledger DL (cf. Section V-A2).
Unfortunately, we cannot trust the controllers themselves to
log their own events and operations, because anyone of them
may be corrupted. So, such logging is to be done by the local
manager of every CPnode, by intercepting all the messages
sent or received by every controllers that resides on the
CPnode in question. And note that the sending or receiving
of a message by a given controller corresponds to some event
that occurred in it, and/or some operation carried out by it.
The events and operations thus logged in ledgers are time-
stamped, using the local time of the CPnode on which the
controller resides; and they identify the controller in question.
Finally, it is important to point out that controllers operating
subject to a given law L, thus serving actors belonging to the
L-community, may reside on different CPnodes. The managers
of these CPnodes would log events that occur of L-controllers
on the DL ledger. Conversely, the manager of a given CPnode,
which may host controllers operating under different laws,
would have to log events on different ledgers.
(b.2) Repairing failed controllers: As discussed in Sec-
tion VI-D1, the reconstruction of a failed L-controller is car-
ried out by the CP—following an instruction by the inspector
IL.
2) The Ledger: As has already been pointed out, there is
one ledger DL per an L-community, which is designed to
maintain entries representing two kind of items: (a) the events
!!!!!!!!"#$!%&'#()$')*&$!+,!-+.!
!
!"
!"
!"
!"
#
$"
%&'#"
()"*+,-./012"
()3.45.2"
6+"()/177#+*089"
:-.260*+5"#+4.2"(;<"
%&'="%&'$"
>?."%1+02133.2)@21$*4.2"
Fig. 2. A Schematic Depiction of the Operation of CoP
that occurred at any given L-controller z, which represent
messages obtained by z from various sources; and (b) the
operations carried out by z, most of which represent messages
sent by it to various targets. These entries are supplied to the
ledger by the CP, as pointed out above.
Such a ledger can have various architectures, providing
different level of security and efficiency to Cop. It can,
in particular, be some form of blockchain, such as under
Ethereum [11] or under HyperLedger [13]. Or it can be just a
file, perhaps replicated, which a given organization maintains
as part of its TCB. We will not discuss here the pros and cons
of the various implementations of the ledger.
3) The Inspector: The objective of an inspector IL, associ-
ated with a given L-community, is twofold: (a) to inspect the
interactive behavior of all the L-controllers, in order to detect
any failure of any of them; and (b) to initiate the recovery
measures for failed controllers.
It is clear that the detection of a corrupt controller, and its
recovery, needs to be done as quickly as possible—because
the longer a corrupt controller is allowed to operate, the
more damage it can do—damage that may be hard to reverse.
The manner in which the inspector operates is discussed in
Section VI.
4) The Architecture of Cop: Figure 2 provides a schematic
depiction of the overall architecture and behavior of Cop.
This figure depicts the treatment under Cop of the interaction
between two actors operating under a law denoted by L, via a
pair of controllers residing in a given controller-provider (CP).
The various events and operation generated by this interaction
are intercepted by the the CP and sent to the L-ledger, which
is inspected by the L-inspector.
VI. INSPECTION: THE PROCESS OF DETECTION AND
RECOVERY OF FAILED CONTROLLERS
This section starts with some introductory observations
about the inspection process. Then, Section VI-B discusses the
inspection of a single L-controller, Section VI-C discusses the
inspection of all the controllers serving a given L-community,
and Section VI-D focuses on the recovery from the failures of
controllers.
A. Introductory Observations
1) Locality: the Key to Effective Detection of Failed Con-
trollers: The detection of the failure of controllers, by in-
specting their interactive behavior, may seem to be a daunting
and time consuming process, because the behavior of each
controller depends on its interaction with others. This seems
to suggest the need for global analysis of the process of
interaction between all controllers for detecting any violation
of the law by any of them.
Fortunately, no such global analysis is required, due to the
inherently local nature of the laws of LGI (cf. Section IV).
This aspect of laws under LGI is what enables it to enforce
its laws locally, and thus efficiently and scalably. And since
the enforcement is local, it follows that non-compliance with
the law can also be dealt with locally—at each controller,
independently of all other controllers. This simplifies the
process of inspection enormously, and makes it very efficient
and scalable. Thus, the locality of laws is the key for effective
detection of the failure of controllers
2) An Invariant of the Inspection Process: The inspector
IL maintains a variable called CSVx—which stands for Con-
troller State-Variable of x—for every L-controller x being
inspected. CSVx is computed, by the inspector, such that the
following invariant is maintained:
The value of CSVx is the correct state of the
controller x associated with the current event that
occurs at x.
By “correct state of the controller” we mean the state that a
good controller x would have associated with the event that
occurs at it. Of course, a failed, Byzantine, controller may
have an arbitrary state, whose value cannot be predicted. We
will see later how this invariant is maintained by the inspector.
3) The Initialization of an L-community Under Cop: We
described in Section IV the process of the creation and in-
cremental development of an L-community under LGI, which
require no formal initialization. But under Cop, this process
needs to be prefaced with the following initialization steps: (a)
the formation of law L; (b) the creation of an empty ledger
DL; and (c) the creation of inspector IL, which is given the law
under which it is to operate. Note that initially this community
has no members, and no activity to be recorded on the ledger
DL. The inspector IL starts examining the ledger, but doing
nothing else until it finds some entries on the ledger to be
inspected.
B. The Inspection of a single L-Controller
Broadly speaking, the process of inspection of a controller
x by the inspector IL starts when x becomes an L-controller.
This happens when x is adopted by some actor a, to operate
subject to a law L. This action by actor a triggers the so-called
adopted event at x, which is the first event in its lifetime. When
this event is intercepted by the CP and stored in the ledgerDL,
it is observed by the inspector IL and inspected, as described
in Section VI-B1 below. After this initial inspection of x,
its inspection continues recursively in response to consecutive
events at x until x quits—as described in Section VI-B2.
For the detailed discussion of this process it would be
helpful to recall the description of an LGI law provided by
Formula 2, namely: a law is a function
law : (e, s)→ (m,ns) (3)
that maps any a given pair (e, s), into a ruling (m,ns). Here
e is an event that occurred in controller x, s is the state of
x at the time of occurrence of this event. And the ruling that
x is to carry out consists of: (a) a (possibly empty) list m
of operations that x is to perform (which are, most often,
messages to be sent); and (b) a new state ns that is to replace
the current state s of x.
1) The initial Inspection of x: This inspection starts when
the inspector IL—which continuously scans the ledger DL
for new entries—notices the adopted event at x on the ledger,
which prompts it to carry out the following sequence of steps.
(i) The inspector creates the variable CSVx of x, whose
value, in general, is to be the correct state of the controller x
associated with any given event that occurs at x. The initial
value of CSVx is set to be an empty set, because, as stated in
Section IV-B, this is the state of every newly formed controller,
before its adopted event is evaluated.
(ii) The inspector computes the ruling of law L for the pair
(e, s), where the event e is the adopted event and the state
s is the current value of CSVx, which is the empty state, as
pointed up above. The ruling (m,ns) defines what a good x
is expected to carry out, atomically.
(iii) Getting this ruling, the inspector changes the value of
CSVx to ns, which is clearly the correct state of x at this
point, because it is mandated by the law.
(iv) The inspector will now verify if the controller x carried
out the required list of operations in m—no more then in
m and no less than in it. To do this, the inspector needs to
compare m to the list m′ of operations found on the ledger
between the adopted event of x and its next event. (This must
be the place for these operations, because the ruling of the law
must be carried out atomically, and thus before the occurrence
of next event at x.) Now, the inspector has two possibility to
consider:
First, if m′ equals to m, then the inspector concludes that
x operates correctly.
Second, if m′ differs from m, the inspector concludes that
x just failed, and it will commence the appropriate recovery
procedure, as described in Section VI-D.
2) The Recursive Inspection of x: Suppose that inspector
IL inspected a sequence of events (e1, e2, ..., en) that occurred
at x, without detecting any failure—where e1 is the very first
event that occurred at x, namely the adopted event discussed
above. The inspection will continue, recursively, to the next
event, if any, as follows:
(i) IL will compute the ruling of the law for the pair
(en+1, sn), where en+1 is the new event at x found on the
ledger, and sn is the current value of CSVx which is obtained
during the previous step of this recursion. Suppose now that
the ruling of the law for the pair (en+1, sn) is the pair
(mn+1, nsn+1), whose structure was described before.
(ii) Getting this ruling, the inspector plants nsn+1 as the
new value of CSVx.
(iii) The inspector will now check if x carried out the
required list of operations mn+1. To do this it needs compare
this list to the list m′ of operations found on the ledger
immediately after the en+1 event of x, and before the next
event that occurred at x, if any. Now, the inspector has, again,
two possibility to consider, in a direct analogy to the two
possibilities it had in the very first inspection of x: First, if
m′ is equals to mn+1, then the inspector concludes that x
operates correctly. And second, if m′ differs from mn+1, then
the inspector concludes that x just failed, and it will commence
the recovery procedure from this failure, as described in
Section VI-D.
It is worth pointing out, again, that the correctness of the
value of CSVx as the true state of the controller which should
be used for the evaluation of the law, is an invariant of this
recursive inspection.
C. The Scalable Process of Inspecting of all L-Controllers
A single inspector can, in principle, inspect all the the L-
controllers that serve a given L-community. Such an inspector
would maintain the CSV of all active L-controllers, in a
single address space. And it would inspect all these controller
virtually in parallel. But there is a potential problem with
this modus operandi of inspection. Namely, when the size of
the community increases, the latency between the failure of
a controller and the detection of this failure grows, roughly
linearly. In other words, such inspection is unscalable with
respect to this latency. And the longer the latency is, the
more opportunity a failed controller would have to send illegal
messages that can cause serious damages to the system, and
which may be very hard to recover from.
Fortunately, it is very easy to make the process of inspection
scalable, as follows: If the set of L-controllers in a given
community is considered too large, in the sense that it produces
overly large latency, one can divide this set to any number
of subgroups that can be handled by different, but identical,
copies of inspector that operate in parallel. Such division can
be done dynamically, while the inspector operates.
D. Recovery from the Failures of Controllers
We consider here two complementary kinds of recoveries.
The first is the resumption of the proper operation of a failed
controller by its reconstruction. The second deals with the
affect of the failed controller on other parts of the system.
1) The Reconstruction of a Failed L-Controller: The recon-
struction of a failed controller x is prompted by the inspector,
and carried out by the local manager of the CPnode that host
x. The reconstruction is carried out by the following sequence
of steps:
(i) Controller x is replaced—without changing its address—
with an authentic generic-controller provided by the CP. (ii)
Law L is planted into x, making it into an L-controller. (iii)
The latest value of CSVx is planted into x. And, (iv) the
reconstructed controller x is reactivated.
2) Regarding the Affect of a Failed Controller on Other
Parts of the System: Note that an L-controller is recognized
by the inspector as failing, after it operated illegally, relative to
law L. Such an illegal operation needs to be corrected. Now,
the ruling of a law is a list of zero or more operations that
are to be carried out by the controller. The failure to carry
out a given ruling consists of one or more instances of two
types of illegality: (a) an illegal inaction, namely, the failure
to carry out one of the operations in the ruling of law L; and
(b) an illegal action, namely, carrying out an operation not
in the ruling of law L. These two types of illegalities require
different handling, discussed below:
a) The Handling of Illegal Inaction: What one needs to
do to recover from this kind of illegality is to carry out the
operation required by the ruling. The Inspector does that right
after discovering a failing controller, for every one of its illegal
inactions, if any.
b) The Handling of Illegal Action: An illegal action
means that the failing controller x sent some message to some
controller y—an operation not mandated by the law. Such a
message cannot be stopped, and its affect on y, and possibly
on other members of the L-community can be quite complex
and possible serious—as exemplified by the discussion of law
MD in Section IV-F. The recovery from such a an illegal
action may depend on the nature of the message sent, on the
law, and on the application at hand, and is not a simple matter.
But Cop can help in recovering from such an illegal action,
by having the inspector notify some designated manager—
one associated with the L-community—which can analyze the
situation and decide how to rectify the problem. The operation
of such a manager is beyond the scope of this paper. But it is
worth pointing out that such a manager may need to examine
parts of the DL ledger, to determine the extent of the affect
of the illegal message.
VII. ADDITIONAL ASPECTS OF COP
A. The Controllable Interoperability Under Cop
As explained in Section IV-E, the LGI part of Cop—which
is the part that enforces laws—provides for a sophisticated
kind of interoperability. This capability of LGI extends to
D&R, and thus to Cop.
Consequently, Cop can be used to govern the interaction
between the the members of disjoint communities. Moreover,
can be used for governing very complex systems, such as
federated enterprises, which comprises of a collection of com-
munities operating under different laws that inter-operate with
each other. Furthermore, it is possible to organize such inter-
operating laws in a conformance hierarchy, which provides
a way to control which communities can inter-operate with
each other, and how. This provides Cop with considerable
generality.
B. The LGI’s Concept of Enforced Obligation, and its Treat-
ment under Cop
The concept of enforced obligation (or “obligation” for
short) provides LGI with an important pro-active capabilities,
invaluable for security and for fault tolerance. This concept
can be used, for example, to ensure that resources will not
stay locked indefinitely, or to penalize book borrowers that do
not return a book in the appointed time.
Informally speaking, an obligation incurred by a given
controller, serves as a kind of motive force, which ensures
that a certain action (called sanction) is carried out by this
controller, at a specified time in the future (the deadline),
when the obligation is said to come due—provided that certain
conditions on the state of the controller are satisfied at that
time. This mechanism is governed by the law in question.
Specifically, a controller x incurs an obligation by the
execution, as part of the ruling of some event, of an operation
imposeObligation(oName,dt), where oName is the name of
the obligation and dt is the time period after which the
obligation is to come due. When this obligation comes due,
after dt seconds, the event obligationDue(oName) would
occur at controller x. The occurrence of this event would cause
the controller to evaluate the ruling of the law for this event,
and to carry out its ruling. The ruling of the law about an
obligationDue(oName) event is, thus, the sanction for
obligation oName.
But this concept of LGI, as is, cannot be supported under
Cop. Because it relies on the controller itself to determine
when the obligationDue(oName) event occurs. And our
D&R mechanism does not, and cannot, rely on the controllers
themselves. So, we implement the concept of obligation under
Cop by making two changes to the obligation mechanism
of LGI, without changing its semantics. First, the operation
imposeObligation(oName,dt) causes a message with this text
to be sent to an obligation-server implemented in the CPnode
where the control x in question resides. When the deadline for
this obligation arrives, the obligation-server is programmed to
send the message obligationDue(oName) to x.
Second, the obligationDue(oName) message sent by the
obligation-server, is viewed by the receiving controller as
an event that would be handled just as the internal event
obligationDue(oName) is handled by the original LGI. That
is, the controller would evaluate the ruling of the law for
this event, and then carry out its ruling—thus preserving the
original semantics of the enforced obligation under LGI.
It should be pointed out that this is the only change in LGI
we make in order to incorporate it in Cop.
C. An Implementation of a Prototype of Cop, and its Testing
We have implemented a fully functional prototype of Cop,
and tested it. The following is a summary of the results of this
testing of the correctness and the performance of the D&R
mechanism of Cop. (The correctness and performance of the
LGI part of Cop has been tested many times in the past, and
these measures did not change under Cop.)
To test the correctness of D&R—which is, in a sense, the
test of the security of Cop—we’ve applied this prototype to
multiple types of test cases, with different laws. We found
no false negatives, i.e., all failed controllers were discovered.
And we found no false positive, i.e., no correct controller were
reported as a failed. Moreover, after the recovery of failed
controllers, they all behaved correctly.
We have also measured the performance of the prototype of
the D&R mechanism. We found (a) the latency of discovering
a failed controller to be 6 seconds, on the average; and (b) the
latency of the recovery of failed controllers to be 2 seconds,
on the average.
But these performance measures have a limited value. First,
because it is just a prototype which we tested, whose code
is not optimized, in particular, it is written in Python 3—
a scripting language with relatively low performance. And
second, because our experiments were done on a relatively
weak hardware, which did not allow us to experiment with
large communities. We expect that our latency result would
be reduced by an order of magnitude, with optimized code,
run on a stronger hardware.
D. On the Trustworthiness and Security of the D&R Mecha-
nism
The D&R mechanism has been designed for protecting
against the possible failure of controllers—which we call the
Achilles heel of LGI. But this protection can be effective
only if the D&R Mechanism itself—consisting of the CP, the
ledgers, and the Inspectors—is secure. That is, these three
components must constitute the trusted computing base (TCB)
of D&R. We believe that our current design of these compo-
nents of D&R of makes these components reasonably secure.
And their security can be enhanced via various traditional
means, including TPM and related technologies. Such security
enhancements are beyond the scope of this work.
VIII. CONCLUSION
This paper introduces a scalable and secure protocol-
enforcement mechanism, called Cop, which fulfills important
qualities for such mechanisms, including low latency, high
scalability, general interoperability and security. It is thus
applicable to a wide range of applications, including small and
large systems, time-critical systems, and systems-of-systems.
Cop enforces protocols via the existing Law-Governed
Interaction (LGI) mechanism, coupled with a new protective
layer called D&R that discovers any failed LGI-controller and
repairs it—which is done soon after the failure occurs. The
D&R layer of Cop operates off-line relative to the enforcement
by LGI, and it significantly enhances the dependability and
security of the enforcement.
We have implemented a fully functional prototype of Cop,
and verified experimentally its correctness. But the evaluation
of the performance and security of Cop, particularly when it
is applied to large scale systems, would require an optimized
implementation of Cop, and a sufficiently powerful hardware
for it to run on.
APPENDIX
SUBSTANTIATING THE MAIN CLAIMS OF THIS PAPER
We have created a fully functional prototype of Cop, and
tested it (cf. Section VII-C). This prototype will be made
available on the authors’ websites.
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